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Abstract: In this study, we examine the effect of directors’ ownership 
on earnings management practices. Explicitly, we draw from the 
agency theory to distinguish between ownership by non-executive 
directors and ownership by executive directors to investigate reasons 
for directors and managerial opportunistic behaviour. Utilising data 
from a sample of 864-firm-year observations ranging from 2009 to 
2017 period, we test our hypothesis through OLS regression. We find 
that non-executive directors’ interests in shareholding are significantly 
associated with higher levels of earnings management. We observed 
a decrease in abnormal accruals on the overall basis of the combined 
ownership of both executive and non-executive directors. Overall, 
ownership by all directors combined significantly reduces managerial 
opportunism. By contrast, there is no evidence that executive directors’ 
ownership mitigates managerial opportunism. This paper contributes 
to corporate governance literature, particularly when the independence 
of board members is essential. This study disaggregates board 
ownership into executive holdings and non-executive holdings, 
dimensions which were hitherto rendered as managerial ownership or 
board ownership. These findings imply firms’ corporate governance 
policy and regulations.  
 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Board of Directors, Ownership, 
Interest, Nigeria  
 
JEL Classification: G30   





                                               
* Corresponding author: E-mail: jehuphilip@gmail.com, Phone: +2348100110704  
Jehu, P., & Ibrahim M. A. 
34 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Corporate boards are statutorily saddled with the responsibility of monitoring the quality of 
informational content of financial reports. Board monitoring is essential because managers 
often have conflicting interest with that of shareholders. This same board is composed of 
executive directors (managers) and to a more significant extent, non-executive directors 
(to demonstrate independence) who jointly take decisions that appertain financial 
reporting. Both categories of directors have rights to own shares in the firm, except for a 
third category within the non-executive directors who are designated explicitly as 
independent non-executive directors.1  
 The issue of corporate board members’ interest in shareholding and its potential 
opportunism on earnings management continues to be a subject of interest in corporate 
governance discussion. Prior studies document that managerial ownership and directors’ 
ownership affect the corporate board’s opportunistic behaviour towards earnings. For 
example, Hooghiemstra, Hermes, Oxelheim, and Randøy (2019) assert that the board of 
directors is a critical mechanism to restrict managers’ opportunistic behaviour. These 
studies have abundant evidence that earnings management stems out of ulterior motive 
and is counterproductive. 
 While the literature generally focuses on managerial ownership, there is little evidence 
examining the opportunism of independent and non-executive directors. In this study, we 
partition board-shareholding in two: managerial and non-executive, to investigate what 
ownership exerts the most effect on earnings management. We ran a regression analysis 
to examine the effect of director ownership on earnings management practices. 
 Our findings suggest that earnings management, as defined by abnormal accruals 
proxy, is significantly higher and is associated with non-executive directors’ interests in 
shareholding. However, no evidence that executive directors’ ownership mitigates 
managerial opportunism. These findings are consistent with the notion that if the board of 
directors have interest in shareholding, they will ensure quality reporting but inconsistent 
with the idea that managers (executive directors) do engage in earnings management if 
they are part owners. 
  Our paper contributes to knowledge by giving more insight into various categories of 
board members about their shareholdings, and how this might affect their opinions, 
judgments, and decisions to report earnings. Accounting and corporate governance 
literature are enhanced. This study might be of interest to corporate boards and 
policymakers. 
 The rest of this paper continues with literature review and hypotheses development in 
Section 2, research design in Section 3, the results in Section 4, and the conclusion in 
Section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The agency theory posits that there is a disparity between firm ownership (stockholders) 
and firm control (managers) (Ran, Fang, Luo, & Chan, 2015). According to Ujunwa, 
Okoyeuzu, and Nwakoby (2012), the agency theory suggests that where management 
and ownership are separate, managers tend to act in self-interest which may not 
necessarily be in the best interest of the shareholders. Hence, there is a need to monitor 
                                               
1 Non-executive directors or outside directors are usually put in place to demonstrate board independence as a requirement 
to fulfil corporate governance regulations. In Nigeria, it is further required to have at least one designated “independent non-
executive director(s)” from among the non-executive directors. This informs the perceived lack of true independence of the 
non-executive directors. 
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the activities of management. This need for board monitoring largely depends on the 
magnitude of the manager's interests’ divergence from that of the shareholders (Peasnell, 
Pope, & Young, 2005). It is expected that managerial shareholding should lead to a greater 
alignment of interests.  
 Proponents of board-shareholding argue that insider (directors) ownership is 
associated with higher earnings quality, thus significant in mitigating earnings 
management (Vafeas, 2005). Similarly, managerial ownership reduces the level of 
earnings management (Alves, 2012). Further, there is evidence that firms having low 
managerial ownership tend to engage in earnings management (O’Callaghan, Ashton, & 
Hodgkinson, 2018). Again, Francis, Hasan, Park, and Wu (2015) pointed out that increase 
in separation between managerial ownership and control will likely lead to agency 
problem, hence affecting managers reporting incentives (Sharon, 2009).  
 Contrariwise, those who argue against this view argue that managerial ownership is 
related to lower earnings quality (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). To buttress this point of 
view, a study shows that the outside non-executive directors’ ownership is associated with 
a higher quality of financial reporting (Klein, 2002). While managers are likely to manage 
earnings to avoid reporting losses, outside (non-executive) directors are more likely to 
reduce earnings (Peasnell et al., 2005).  
 Teshima and Shuto (2008) assumed that there are two types of motivations for 
managerial shareholding. First is that if managers own shares, they will work to enhance 
its value. Second, if managers expect re-appointment, they will try to impress 
shareholders. These incentives provide an opportunity for managers to present quality 
financial reports that are free from opportunism. Based on the preceding arguments, we 
hypothesized that: 
 
H₁:  Directors’ interest in share ownership is negatively associated with earnings 
management 
H₂:  Non-executive directors’ interest in share ownership is negatively associated with 
earnings management 
H₃:  Executive directors’ interest in share ownership is negatively associated with 
earnings management. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Data and Sample 
 
The sample is comprised of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as of 2017, 
excluding financial institutions because of its peculiar accounting and regulatory 
framework on corporate governance. Corporate governance data were extracted from 
listed firms’ annual reports downloaded from the website of the NSE, covering 2009 to 
2017 period. Financial data were obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon database.  
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
 
Many authors have used various earnings management models and proxies: abnormal 
(discretionary) accruals, fraud, misstatement, and so on. To analyse the relationship 
between the board of directors’ interest in shareholding and earnings management, we 
utilised the accruals-based measure. The discretionary accruals are easier to manage but 
difficult to detect by investors. So, it offers the managers the opportunity to choose 
between methods that potentially favour the presentation of their performance even if it 
could turn otherwise. Consistent with extant accounting and corporate control literature, 
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we utilise the abnormal accruals as earnings management proxy (Abbott, Daugherty, 
Parker, & Peters, 2016; Hooghiemstra et al., 2019; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; 
Waweru & Prot, 2018). This measure is the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-matched 
model. We employed this proxy because firm performance might be a key reason for 
boards decision when their interests are at stake. 
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where, 
Aᵢₜ  = lagged total assets 
𝛥REVᵢₜ  = change in revenues in year t 
𝛥RECᵢₜ  = change in receivables in year t 
PPEᵢₜ  = gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
ROAᵢₜ  = return on assets in year t 
𝜀  = error term. 
 
3.3 The Model 
 
This study utilises the regression in equation (2) to test whether corporate board-
shareholding substantially constrain the incidence of earnings management. 
 
 𝐸𝑀 = 	𝛽₀ + 	𝛽₁DOWNᵢₜ+ 	𝛽₂NEDOWNᵢₜ+ 𝛽₃EDOWNᵢₜ+ 𝛽₄CTENᵢₜ+ 𝛽₅BSIZEᵢₜ
+ 𝛽₆NEXDᵢₜ+ 𝛽₇NLFSIZEᵢₜ+ 	𝛽₈LEVᵢₜ+ 𝛽₉ROAᵢₜ+ 	𝛽₁₀FAGEᵢₜ+ 	𝜀ᵢₜ (2) 
 
All the variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
3.4 Explanatory Variables 
 
In Nigeria, corporate governance laws require a listed firm to disclose its ownership 
structure, and to disclose the shareholding interests of all the directors specifically. In 
some of the firms, directors’ ownership could be quite substantial. As it is the responsibility 
of the directors to prepare financial statements, conflict of interest might set in subject to 
what class of director and the extent of shareholding. To analyse whether board-
shareholding constrains accruals earnings management, we utilise three classes of 
ownership variables: all directors’ ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership and 
executive directors’ ownership. DOWN is the proportion of shares owned by all the 
directors. NEDOWN is the fraction of shares owned by the non-executive directors. 
EDOWN is the proportion of shares owned by the executive directors. 
 
3.5 Control variables 
 
As in other studies, we include a number of control variables that are associated with 
earnings management: CEO tenure (CTEN), board size (BSIZE), non-executive directors 
(NEXD), firm size (NLFSIZE), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), and firm age 
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3.6 Variable definitions 
 
Table 1. Variable measurements 
Variable name Measurement Source 
EM The Kothari et al. (2005) measurement model Waweru and Prot (2018) 
DOWN The proportion of shares held by all directors Waweru and Prot (2018); 
Teshima and Shuto (2008) 
NEDOWN The proportion of share ownership by non-executive 
directors 
Vafeas (2005) 
EDOWN The proportion of share ownership by executive 
directors 
Alzoubi (2014) 
CTEN The number of years CEO was in office Ebrahim (2007) 
BSIZE The number of board members of a firm in a year Alves (2012) 
NEXD The number of non-executive (outside) directors 
scaled by board size 
Waweru and Prot (2018) 
NLFSIZE The natural log of total assets Tessema et al. (2018) 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets  Tessema et al. (2018) 
ROA Profit or loss after tax divided by total assets (O’Callaghan et al., 2018) 
FAGE The number of years firm was incorporated Tessema et al. (2018) 
EM represents earnings management; DOWN represents directors’ ownership; NEDOWN represents non-executive 
directors’ ownership; EDOWN represents executive directors’ ownership; CTEN represents CEO tenure; BSIZE represents 
board size; NEXD represents the proportion of non-executive directors on board; NLFSIZE represents the natural log of firm 




4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. Concerning the test variables, we notice that the 
mean value of all the directors’ shareholding DOWN, is 21%. The non-executive directors 
NEDOWN have a mean value of 11%, and the executive directors have a mean value of 
2%. Overall, this suggests that directors on corporate boards in Nigeria have controlling 
interests in their firms’ ownership. 
 Further, the average CEO, CTEN has been with the board for 5 years, indicating some 
lots of experience. The average board size BSIZE is 9, with values that range from 4 to 
15. Out of this, 70% of the sampled boards members are non-executive directors, which 
suggest higher board independence. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
EM 864 .0011 .2520 .0819 .0421 .2522 2.486 
DOWN 864 .0030 .8000 .2089 .2302 .9757 2.587 
NEDOWN 864 .0017 .6435 .1147 .1100 1.485 5.414 
EDOWN 864 0 .1555 .0195 .0284 2.308 8.721 
CTEN 864 1 16 4.609 2.981 .9093 3.423 
BSIZE 864 4 15 8.661 2.268 .3157 2.584 
NEXD 864 .333 .923 .7042 .1294 -.4853 2.626 
NLFSIZE 864 4.488 14.24 9.276 1.832 .06056 2.649 
LEV 864 .0234 .9803 .5270 .2046 -.3054 2.601 
ROA 864 -.891 .7927 .1362 .2363 -.1625 3.983 
FAGE 864 3 94 38.44 19.32 .1422 2.353 
EM represents earnings management; DOWN represents directors’ ownership; NEDOWN represents non-executive 
directors’ ownership; EDOWN represents executive directors’ ownership; CTEN represents CEO tenure; BSIZE represents 
board size; NEXD represents the proportion of non-executive directors on board; NLFSIZE represents the natural log of firm 
size; LEV represents leverage; ROA represents return on assets; FAGE represents firm age. 
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4.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3 presents the correlations of the variables. The correlation pattern shows no 
multicollinearity issue. The average variance inflation factor is 1.21 and ranges from 1.03 
to 1.43. The analysis shows a negative correlation and significance between EM and 
DOWN, which suggests that earnings management is significantly lower for firms more 
director ownership. The analysis also shows quite several significances between and 
among the variables, but overall, no problem of multicollinearity. 
 
Table 3. Correlations 
 EM DOWN NEDOWN EDOWN CTEN BSIZE BCNEX FSIZE LEV ROA FAGE 
EM 1.000           
DOWN -0.116* 1.000          
NEDOWN 0.086* 0.145* 1.000         
EDOWN 0.007 -0.018 0.129* 1.000        
CTEN -0.110* -0.015 0.091* 0.070* 1.000       
BSIZE -0.088* -0.110* 0.044 -0.113* -0.005 1.000      
NEXD -0.056 -0.165* -0.043 -0.104* 0.001 0.275* 1.000     
NLFSIZE -0.070* -0.263* -0.091* -0.099* 0.015 0.388* -0.014 1.000    
LEV 0.015 -0.121* 0.025 0.115* 0.074* -0.031 -0.031 0.209* 1.000   
ROA 0.048 -0.120* 0.238* 0.040 -0.006 0.040 0.027 0.122* -0.12* 1.000  
FAGE 0.033 -0.327* -0.019 0.098* 0.125* 0.001 -0.009 0.093* 0.280* 0.097* 1.000 
Significance * is 5% or better. EM represents earnings management; DOWN represents directors’ ownership; NEDOWN represents 
non-executive directors’ ownership; EDOWN represents executive directors’ ownership; CTEN represents CEO tenure; BSIZE 
represents board size; NEXD represents the proportion of non-executive directors on board; NLFSIZE represents the natural log of 
firm size; LEV represents leverage; ROA represents return on assets; FAGE represents firm age. 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results. We find that the proportion of shares owned by 
all directors DOWN is negatively associated with earnings management, -0.036, 
significant at 5% level. This finding is consistent with prior studies and indicates a context 
wherein all board of directors could effectively restrain earnings management, hence 
lending support to hypothesis 1 (H₁). We do not find evidence of curbing abnormal 
accruals when non-executive directors’ ownership NEDOWN is concerned, though 
significant by encouraging bold choices. Hence, H₂ is not supported. This is contrary to 
expectation. The non-executive directors are expected to bring independence of opinion 
and objectivity of perspectives. A plausible explanation for this might be the low average 
interest of the non-executive directors in shareholding. The non-executive directors, like 
the shareholders, might act aggressively if their investments are at risk, or if their 
ownership increases. The coefficient for the executive directors EDOWN is not significant, 
so H₃ is not supported. 
 All the explanatory variables are not significant, except CEO tenure (CTEN) that shows 
significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Regression analysis between earnings management (DV) and the explanatory variables (IVs) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effect Random Effect Random Effect (Robust) 
DOWN -0.036** -0.036*** -0.036** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) 
NEDOWN 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.053** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) 
EDOWN -0.034 -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.060) (0.056) (0.121) 
CTEN -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
BSIZE 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
NEXD 0.028 0.008 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) 
NLFSIZE -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
LEV -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
ROA 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
FAGE -0.001** -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.027) 
Observations 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.053 0.044 0.044 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
EM represents earnings management; DOWN represents directors’ ownership; NEDOWN represents non-executive 
directors’ ownership; EDOWN represents executive directors’ ownership; CTEN represents CEO tenure; BSIZE represents 
board size; NEXD represents the proportion of non-executive directors on board; NLFSIZE represents the natural log of firm 




This study examines the association between the board of directors’ interest in 
shareholding and earnings management. Recent cases of financial reporting scandals 
have lent credence to the concern that the people whose responsibility is to prepare 
financial reports might get engaged in managing earnings. As prior studies have shown 
that a critical determinant of earnings management practice is corporate governance, we 
specifically examine corporate board shareholding as explained by the agency 
phenomenon. We partition between executive directors’ ownership and non-executive 
directors’ ownership to investigate which class of ownership exerts the most influence on 
earnings management. We find that non-executive directors’ interests in shareholding are 
significantly associated with higher levels of earnings management. This implies that an 
increase in directors’ shareholding is an incentive for aggressive opinion towards earnings, 
probably if the investment is at risk. We find no significance on executive directors’ 
ownership. Overall, ownership by all directors combined significantly reduces managerial 
opportunism. 
 As in any study, this research is without some limitations. The study is drawn from the 
Nigerian regulatory context. So, the generalization of our findings should be taken with 
caution. Future studies could consider looking into whether the directors’ shareholding is 
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